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Does China’s weak domestic demand really lead to excess capacity?: People's Daily_我的网站

一 |     8月26日讯 距离夏窗关闭仅剩不到一周的时间，然而曼城和利物浦今夏引援迟缓，在这方面落后卫冕冠军阿森纳，The Athletic记者Jordan Campbell发文对这一情况进行了解读。

二 |     

    A worker fulfills orders for energy-saving and environmentally friendly boilers destined for export in a manufacturing enterprise in Nantong, East China's Jiangsu Province on August 4, 2026. The enterprise offers products including industrial waste disposal equipment, with sales to more than 30 countries and regions. Photo: CNS PhotoIn recent years, some economies, anxious about their own industrial competitiveness and market position, have politicized economic and trade issues, taking turns to hype false narratives such as "China overcapacity" and a "China Shock 2.0," and using them as pretexts to roll out protectionist measures.
But what are the facts on the ground?
China's Ministry of Commerce recently released a document titled China's Position on the So-Called Excess Capacity Issue. Reviewing the evolution of the global capacity landscape from a historical perspective, it offers an objective analysis of how industrial subsidies, trade surpluses, economic imbalances and market competition relate to "overcapacity," sets out China's policy practices and the direction of its efforts, and puts forward China's ideas and proposals - a forceful response to the "China overcapacity" narrative. 
Plainly, the argument that "China's inadequate domestic demand gives rise to excess capacity" rests on a logical sleight of hand - it takes a localized phenomenon at the micro level of the market and applies it wholesale to the structure of the macroeconomy, a picture far removed from reality.
China is not only a major manufacturing power but also a major consuming power. Domestic demand has long been the main engine of the Chinese economy.
To see through the logical fallacy of the "overcapacity" narrative, one must first be clear about where the Chinese economy actually sits in the global landscape.
In the course of economic globalization, China has actively integrated itself into the international division of industrial labor and become the "world's factory" in the truest sense. Chinese manufacturing has enriched the global supply of goods, lowered living costs for consumers in countries around the world, and played an important part in easing global inflationary pressure. But to define China simply as a "producer" on that basis, and from there to conclude that it suffers from "inadequate domestic demand and overcapacity," is a proposition that does not hold water.
From 2013 to 2024, domestic demand contributed an average of 93 percent to China's economic growth, with consumption and investment accounting for an average of 55 percent and 38 percent respectively. China's total retail sales of consumer goods rose from 23.8 trillion yuan ($3.53 trillion) in 2013 to 50.1 trillion yuan in 2025, doubling in size.
Measured at the World Bank's purchasing power parity rates, China's total retail sales of consumer goods in 2025 were 1.7 times those of the US, making the country the world's largest market for consumer goods in all but name. China today ranks first globally in the physical volume of goods consumed, and its per capita annual consumption of some industrial products already approaches the levels seen in developed economies.
China keeps expanding its domestic demand and is working toward a higher-level balance between supply and demand.
Growth in China's total retail sales of consumer goods has slowed somewhat in recent years, and some have taken this as proof of weak domestic demand. That reading is neither objective nor complete.
A strong domestic market provides strategic support for Chinese modernization. The outline of China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period devotes a dedicated part to building such a market, stressing the need to adhere to the strategic focus of expanding domestic demand, to expand effective investment, to further implement special actions to boost consumption, to promote the expansion and upgrading of commodity consumption, to unleashing the potential of service consumption, to strengthening the foundation of residents' consumption and to continuously improve the consumption environment - using new demand to guide new supply, and using new supply to create new demand, so as to promote a virtuous cycle between consumption and investment, and between supply and demand, achieve a higher level of dynamic balance between supply and demand.
The slowdown in retail sales growth is consistent with China's shift from high-speed growth to high-quality development, and it also reflects the upgrading of the country's consumption structure. China's consumer market is moving faster from one dominated by goods toward one in which goods and services carry equal weight. Spending on services is growing rapidly and is expected to account for more than half of the total by 2030.
China's super-sized market is not only the bedrock of its own development but also a broad platform on which countries around the world can share in the dividends of that growth.
China has ranked as the world's second-largest importer for 17 consecutive years and is a major export destination for nearly 80 countries and regions. It has granted zero-tariff treatment to 63 countries and regions, becoming the first major economy in the world to extend full zero-tariff coverage to every African country and every least developed country that has diplomatic relations with it. It is also the only country to host an international import expo, having staged eight editions of the China International Import Expo with cumulative intended deals worth more than $580 billion. Over the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25) period, China's cumulative imports topped 90 trillion yuan. These facts and figures show clearly that China is not just the "world's factory" but, still more, the "world's market."
Looking ahead, China's middle-income group is set to exceed 800 million people within little more than a decade, and per capita GDP is expected to reach the level of a moderately developed country. With vast room for consumption and ample potential and vitality, domestic demand will remain the main engine of China's economic development and will keep injecting strong momentum into world economic growth.
This was compiled and translated by the Global Times English edition based on an article published in the "Chisu Jinsheng" economic commentary column of the People's Daily on August 6, 2026.
。在亚马逊最新推出的瓜迪奥拉纪录片《美丽的执念》中，曼城主席穆巴拉克坦言，让老将多留一个赛季的决定让他们付出了代价。

三 | CEO索里亚诺则表示，球队的“综合质量指数”——该数据与夺冠概率息息相关——已下滑至156，落后利物浦和阿森纳。利物浦夏窗迄今为止仅签下雅凯和穆尼奥斯两名新援，但后腰和边后卫位置的短板显而易见，红军依然没有找到萨拉赫的接班人，也尚未对此进行任何实质性补强。在新帅马雷斯卡和伊劳拉麾下，球队经历“成长的烦恼”本在情理之中。但新赛季首轮的较量彻底暴露了两队在人员配置上的明显隐患，伊劳拉更是直言自己的阵容“太过单薄”。由于在关键引援上拖延至此，两名主帅只能在赛季进行中磨合，新援们只能以赛代练、边踢边学，无法花上几周时间去慢慢消化复杂的战术理念。

四 | 这种做法即便算不上失职，也绝对是低效的。TA指出，自2002-03赛季英超设立夏窗以来，“BIG6”有20%的转会支出集中在窗口最后一周。

五 | 如果曼城和利物浦最终真的敲定重磅引援，那么今年夏天他们都将创下队史“最晚消费”纪录。此前这两家俱乐部在转会市场上向来都是早早敲定引援，通常7月初便“点击下单”完成“提货”，没有拉锯摩擦，极少压力焦虑。在“新战车”正式上路前，他们会留有数周时间来打磨这些“闪亮的拼图”。去年夏天，利物浦在6月便签下了弗林蓬、凯尔凯兹和维尔茨，7月又拿下埃基蒂克，唯一的例外是伊萨克。相比之下，曼城的操作更是将“早”字体现得淋漓尽致。2017年是瓜迪奥拉对阵容进行全面大换血的一年，城市集团的智囊们精准剖析了那些常年多线夺冠球队的年龄结构，并迅速付诸行动：7月1日从本菲卡引进埃德森，同日从摩纳哥签下B席，7月17日从热刺引进凯尔·沃克，7月23日从皇马签下达尼洛，7月24日再从摩纳哥拿下本杰明·门迪，新阵容提前三周便全部就位。2018年，马赫雷斯在7月7日便加盟曼城。2019年，罗德里和坎塞洛分别在7月4日和8月7日前入队。2021年，曼城在7月1日前敲定哈兰德。

六 | 去年夏天，艾特-努里、赖因德斯和谢尔基均在6月初完成签约。纵观队史，曼城此前仅有两次在赛季开打后还在进行重磅夏窗引援：一次是2020年9月的鲁本·迪亚斯，另一次则是去年9月签下多纳鲁马。时过境迁，曼城今年在世界杯期间1.16亿英镑签下埃利奥特·安德森，但后续的引援工作却进展缓慢。事实上，他们直到最近才与里尔中场布阿迪达成协议，而这笔交易已经拖了整整一个夏天。切尔西甚至人为设定最后期限，逼迫曼城为恩佐支付1.2亿英镑。与此同时，曼城对水晶宫中场亚当·沃顿和伯恩茅斯中场斯科特的试探均遭拒绝，因此罗马中场科内也进入了他们的视野。随着萨维尼奥和马尔穆什双双转投热刺，曼城还急需寻找替代者，帕尔梅拉斯边锋阿兰·埃利亚斯的转会已接近完成。

七 | 这是体育总监维亚纳改变策略导致转会操作延迟吗？一位匿名接受采访的体育总监表示，外界并不完全理解“账上有钱”“能够花钱”以及“遵守史上最严苛的财务规定”这三者之间的巨大差异。如今，即便是豪门也必须“先卖后买”，而阿森纳则是个例外。

八 | 自2022-23赛季跻身争冠行列以来，阿森纳尚未出售过任何一名一线队主力。

九 | 然而，如果马丁内利最终被高价出售，那他们此前买入措利斯的操作就仅仅是为了提前填补马丁内利离队后的空缺罢了。而曼城在球员出售方面做得极其出色，回笼了近4亿镑资金。但等待球员出售完成后再进行引援的问题在于全世界都知道你有钱，这通常会导致被卖方狠宰一笔“豪门税”。曼城最新的纪录片为今夏的足坛格局提供了深刻的洞察，在这个夏窗，阿森纳成为了自上赛季初以来，英超前六球队中唯一没有更换主帅的俱乐部。曼城CEO索里亚诺坦言：“我们签下的球员都非常年轻，正处于一个全新周期的起点。

十 | 而阿森纳引进的球员年龄偏大，平均年龄达到27岁。阿森纳追求的是即战力，而我们选择投资年轻球员。这是我们的选择，也是我们甘愿承担的风险。”阿森纳显然不愿冒这样的风险，他们敏锐地察觉到竞争对手们正处于动荡的过渡期，需要时间重建，而这正是枪手早已规划好的发力时刻。2019年底阿尔特塔接手球队时，正值曼城与利物浦双雄争霸的鼎盛时期。于是阿森纳制定了一个五年计划，预测双雄统治期自然衰退的节点，2023年至2027年就被枪手高层锁定为球队冲击巅峰的黄金窗口。阿森纳如今已具备冠军底蕴，正是乘势而上的大好机会。从纽卡签下吉马良斯，从维拉签下孔萨，这两笔转会充分彰显了球队“赢在当下”的决心。阵容更替规划、投资潜力球员、降低平均年龄……这些理念几乎成了现代足球战略的“圣经”。

十一 | 然而，对于顶级豪门而言，维持巅峰地位的压力始终存在，这就需要那些“来之能战”的成熟型球员。短短几年间，阿森纳从英超最年轻的球队变成了平均年龄最大的球队之一，但他们换来了宝贵的稳定性，这是千金难求的。阿森纳或许会重蹈曼城去年的覆辙，面临核心阵容保持时间过长的问题，衰退期也许会在明后年悄然降临。但如果签下正处于当打之年且证明过自己的冠军拼图能够带来一座座沉甸甸的奖杯，那绝对比盲目押注潜力而错失霸权要明智得多。

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Published on:03:29:51